Dorothy is an eyewitness to a crime: A man has robbed a bank, but instead of keeping the money for himself, he donates it to a poor orphanage that can now afford to feed, clothe, and care for its children. Dorothy knows who committed the crime. If she goes to the authorities with the information, there’s a good chance the money will be returned to the bank, leaving a lot of kids in need. Dorothy is unsure what she should do.Readings will be provided, need to be answered according to the readings No outside researchIn a 2-3 page essay answer the following questions and explain your reasoning:According to Divine Command Theory what should Dorothy do? Why?According to Virtue Ethics Theory what should Dorothy do? Why?If you were Dorothy, what would you do? Why?Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics Book II, 350 BCE. Translated by W.D. Ross (1998), The Internet Classics
Archive, 2009, Accessed 24 Apr. 2016.
Nicomachean Ethics, Book II
By Aristotle (350 BCE)
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth
and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes
about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from
the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for
nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by
nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by
throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything
else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor
contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are
made perfect by habit.
Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the
activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got
these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by
using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as
well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become
builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts,
temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.
This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in
them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in
this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.
Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and
destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are
produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or
bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need
of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the
virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust,
and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or
confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some
men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way
or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like
activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of
character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we
form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all
the difference.
Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are
inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry
would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them;
for these determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced, as we have said. Now,
that we must act according to the right rule is a common principle and must be assumed-it will be
discussed later, i.e. both what the right rule is, and how it is related to the other virtues. But this must
be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and
not precisely, as we said at the very beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with
the subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity,
any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular
cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or precept but the agents
themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of
medicine or of navigation.
But though our present account is of this nature we must give what help we can. First, then, let us
consider this, that it is the nature of such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the
case of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the evidence of
sensible things); both excessive and defective exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food
which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both
produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and
the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his ground
against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every
danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none
becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way
insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the
But not only are the sources and causes of their origination and growth the same as those of their
destruction, but also the sphere of their actualization will be the same; for this is also true of the things
which are more evident to sense, e.g. of strength; it is produced by taking much food and undergoing
much exertion, and it is the strong man that will be most able to do these things. So too is it with the
virtues; by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it is when we have become so that we
are most able to abstain from them; and similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated to
despise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we become brave, and it is when
we have become so that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them.
We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the man who
abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed
at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or
at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral excellence is
concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on
account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a
particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things
that we ought; for this is the right education.
Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is
accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and
pains. This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of
cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected by contraries.
Again, as we said but lately, every state of soul has a nature relative to and concerned with the kind of
things by which it tends to be made worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men
become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these- either the pleasures and pains they ought not or when
they ought not or as they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that may be
distinguished. Hence men even define the virtues as certain states of impassivity and rest; not well,
however, because they speak absolutely, and do not say ‘as one ought’ and ‘as one ought not’ and ‘when
one ought or ought not’, and the other things that may be added. We assume, then, that this kind of
excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains, and vice does the contrary.
The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned with these same things. There
being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and
their contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right
and the bad man to go wrong, and especially about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and also
it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous appear pleasant.
Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion,
engrained as it is in our life. And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the
rule of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be about these; for to feel
delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions.
Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, to use Heraclitus’ phrase’, but both art and
virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore
for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures and pains;
for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad.
That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that by the acts from which it arises it is
both increased and, if they are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are
those in which it actualizes itself- let this be taken as said.
The question might be asked,; what we mean by saying that we must become just by doing just acts,
and temperate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just and temperate acts, they are already just and
temperate, exactly as, if they do what is in accordance with the laws of grammar and of music, they are
grammarians and musicians.
Or is this not true even of the arts? It is possible to do something that is in accordance with the laws of
grammar, either by chance or at the suggestion of another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only
when he has both done something grammatical and done it grammatically; and this means doing it in
accordance with the grammatical knowledge in himself.
Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; for the products of the arts have their
goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character, but if the acts
that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they
are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the
first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own
sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. These are not
reckoned in as conditions of the possession of the arts, except the bare knowledge; but as a condition of
the possession of the virtues knowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions count not for
a little but for everything, i.e. the very conditions which result from often doing just and temperate acts.
Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would
do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as
just and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is
produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have
even a prospect of becoming good.
But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and
will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors,
but do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a
course of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.
Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the soul are of three kindspassions, faculties, states of character, virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger,
fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings
that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be
capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character
the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to
anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly
with reference to the other passions.
Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not called good or bad on the ground
of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man
who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our
vices we are praised or blamed.
Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice.
Further, in respect of the passions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices
we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way.
For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor
blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we
are not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues are neither
passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of character.
Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.
We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character, but also say what sort of state it is.
We may remark, then, that every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which
it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes
both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the
excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running and at carrying its rider
and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man also
will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well.
How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made plain also by the following
consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible
to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and
the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that
which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by the
intermediate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little- and this is not one, nor the
same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the
object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediate according to arithmetical
proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a
particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for
this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to take it, or too little- too little for Milo, too much
for the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a master of any art
avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this- the intermediate not in the
object but relatively to us.
If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by looking to the intermediate and judgling its works
by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or
to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean
preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is more exact
and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the
intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these
there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and
anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both
cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right
people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is
characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the
intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure,
and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being
successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it
aims at what is intermediate.
Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the
Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way
(for which reason also one is easy and the other difficult- to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for
these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue;
For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us,
this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom
would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which
depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is
right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence
in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to
what is best and right an extreme.
But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply
badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of
these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or
deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be
wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with
the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong. It
would be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action there should
be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess and of
deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency of
temperance and courage because what is intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions
we have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they are done they
are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a
We must, however, not only make this general statement, but also apply it to the individual facts. For
among statements about conduct those which are general apply more widely, but those which are
particular are more genuine, since conduct has to do with individual cases, and our statements must
harmonize with the facts in these cases. We may take these cases from our table. With regard to
feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in
fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence
is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. With regard to pleasures
and pains- not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains- the mean is temperance, the
excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such
persons also have received no name. But let us call them ‘insensible’.
With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality
and meanness. In these actions people exceed and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in
spending and falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in spending. (At
present we are giving a mere outline or summary, and are satisfied with this; later these states will be
more exactly determined.) With regard to money there are also other dispositions- a mean,
magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from the liberal man; the former deals with large sums,
the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency, niggardliness; these
differ from the states opposed to liberality, and the mode of their difference will be stated later. With
regard to honour and dishonour the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of ’empty
vanity’, and the deficiency is undue humility; and as we said liberality was related to magnificence,
differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a state similarly related to proper pride, being
concerned with small honours while that is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire honour as
one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called
ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious, while the intermediate person has no name. The
dispositions also are nameless, except that that of the ambitious man is called ambition. Hence the
people who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle place; and we ourselves sometimes call the
intermediate person ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes praise the ambitious man
and sometimes the unambitious. The reason of our doing this will be stated in what follows; but now let
us speak of the remaining states according to the method which has been indicated.
With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean. Although they can scarcely be
said to have names, yet since we call the intermediate person good-tempered let us call the mean good
temper; of the persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds be called irascible, and his vice
irascibility, and the man who falls short an inirascible sort of person, and the deficiency inirascibility.
There are also three other means, which have a certain likeness to one another, but differ from one
another: for they are all concerned with intercourse in words and actions, but differ in that one is
concerned with truth in this sphere, the other two with pleasantness; and of this one kind is exhibited in
giving amusement, the other in all the circumstances of life. We must therefore speak of these too, that
we may the better see that in all things the mean is praise-worthy, and the extremes neither
praiseworthy nor right, but worthy of blame. Now most of these states also have no names, but we
must try, as in the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be clear and easy to follow.
With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the mean may be called
truthfulness, while the pretence which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a
boaster, and that which understates is mock modesty and the person characterized by it mock-modest.
With regard to pleasantness in the giving of amusement the intermediate person is ready-witted and
the disposition ready wit, the excess is buffoonery and the person characterized by it a buffoon, while
the man who falls short is a sort of boor and his state is boorishness. With regard to the remaining kind
of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is
friendly and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if he has no
end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage, and the man who falls short and is
unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person.
There are also means in the passions and concerned with the passions; since shame is not a virtue, and
yet praise is extended to the modest man. For even in these matters one man is said to be intermediate,
and another to exceed, as for instance the bashful man who is ashamed of everything; while he who
falls short or is not ashamed of anything at all is shameless, and the intermediate person is modest.
Righteous indignation is a mean between envy and spite, and these states are concerned with the pain
and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes of our neighbours; the man who is characterized by righteous
indignation is pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond him, is pained at all
good fortune, and the spiteful man falls so far short of being pained that he even rejoices. But these
states there will be an opportunity of describing elsewhere; with regard to justice, since it has not one
simple meaning, we shall, after describing the other states, distinguish its two kinds and say how each of
them is a mean; and similarly we shall treat also of the rational virtues.
There are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving excess and deficiency
respectively, and one a virtue, viz. the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states
are contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the intermediate to the extremes; as
the equal is greater relatively to the less, less relatively to the greater, so the middle states are excessive
relatively to the deficiencies, deficient relatively to the excesses, both in passions and in actions. For the
brave man appears rash relatively to the coward, and cowardly relatively to the rash man; and similarly
the temperate man appears self-indulgent relatively to the insensible man, insensible relatively to the
self-indulgent, and the liberal man prodigal relatively to the mean man, mean relatively to the prodigal.
Hence also the people at the extremes push the intermediate man each over to the other, and the brave
man is called rash by the coward, cowardly by the rash man, and correspondingly in the other cases.
These states being thus opposed to one another, the greatest contrariety is that of the extremes to each
other, rather than to the intermediate; for these are further from each other than from the
intermediate, as the great is further from the small and the small from the great than both are from the
equal. Again, to the intermediate some extremes show a certain likeness, as that of rashness to courage
and that of prodigality to liberality; but the extremes show the greatest unlikeness to each other; now
contraries are defined as the things that are furthest from each other, so that things that are further
apart are more contrary.
To the mean in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess is more opposed; e.g. it is not rashness,
which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency, that is more opposed to courage, and not
insensibility, which is a deficiency, but self-indulgence, which is an excess, that is more opposed to
temperance. This happens from two reasons, one being drawn from the thing itself; for because one
extreme is nearer and liker to the intermediate, we oppose not this but rather its contrary to the
intermediate. E.g. since rashness is thought liker and nearer to courage, and cowardice more unlike, we
oppose rather the latter to courage; for things that are further from the intermediate are thought more
contrary to it. This, then, is one cause, drawn from the thing itself; another is drawn from ourselves; for
the things to which we ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to the intermediate. For
instance, we ourselves tend more naturally to pleasures, and hence are more easily carried away
towards self-indulgence than towards propriety. We describe as contrary to the mean, then, rather the
directions in which we more often go to great lengths; and therefore self-indulgence, which is an excess,
is the more contrary to temperance.
That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the
one involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at what is
intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated. Hence also it is no easy task to be
good. For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for
every one but for him who knows; so, too, any one can get angry- that is easy- or give or spend money;
but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the
right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and
Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what is the more contrary to it, as
Calypso advisesHold the ship out beyond that surf and spray.
For of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore, since to hit the mean is hard in the
extreme, we must as a second best, as people say, take the least of the evils; and this will be done best
in the way we describe. But we must consider the things towards which we ourselves also are easily
carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will be recognizable from the
pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get
into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that
are bent.
Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against; for we do not judge it
impartially. We ought, then, to feel towards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and
in all circumstances repeat their saying; for if we dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to go astray. It is
by doing this, then, (to sum the matter up) that we shall best be able to hit the mean.
But this is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases; for or is not easy to determine both how
and with whom and on what provocation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes
praise those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we praise those who get angry
and call them manly. The man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he
do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more widely; for he
does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he
becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is
perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception.
So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate state is in all things to be praised, but that we must incline
sometimes towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit the
mean and what is right.

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  • Click “CREATE ACCOUNT & SIGN IN” to enter your registration details and get an account with us for record-keeping and then, click on “PROCEED TO CHECKOUT” at the bottom of the page.
  • From there, the payment sections will show, follow the guided payment process and your order will be available for our writing team to work on it.